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Abstract:
In this article, I will briefly discuss the reinvention of the samurai and of the mer-
chants, which began in the Tokugawa and then extended into the Meiji period; my as-
sumption is that both samurai and merchants played a crucial part in he advent of mo-
dernity in Japan, and that the thoroughness of the process through which they were 
reinvented is accounted for by developments from pre-modern (“post-historical”) Ja-
pan.
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1 .　Japan as post-history
In an ironic footnote to Hegel, Alexandre Kojève (1980) defines 
Japan after 1945 as a post-historical realm, as a nostalgia-free soci-
ety with values completely empty of all human content in the his-
torical sense; these values, he claims, were lost in the atomic bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Miraculously, Japan emerged 
intact out of the atomic ashes ― out of dead, or empty life ― as a 
nonhistorical being, a creature without a history. However, at the 
same time, this creature has great learning potential and strength, 
and is possessed of a sensitivity greater than any other country’s, in 
part because of its sense of difference and insecurity about its his-
torical identity. 
According to Akira Asada, Jean Baudrillard, Francis Fukuyama 1  
and others, there can be identified three periods of ‘post-historicity’ 
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(or, ‘end of history’) in Japanese history. The first period is the 
Tokugawa 徳川 era (1603-1868), especially after the 1630’s, when 
the Christian missionaries were banned out of Japan, thus marking 
the beginning of the sakoku 鎖国 (‘closed country’) policy, when 
contact with the outside world was officially banned and limited to 
trade with the Dutch at Dejima 出島 , a small island outside Naga-
saki. Thus, Japan was left (or, rather, she left herself) outside the 
general flow of world history and became a post-historical realm. 
The second period is August 1945, when the atomic bombs were 
dropped upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the devastating effects 
of nuclear power made the whole world realize that the end may be 
very near. This moment of post-historicity is relevant for the whole 
mankind. The third period is in the 1990’s, after the end of the 
‘bubble economy’ period in Japan, when what happened in Japa-
nese society became a clear indicator of the fact that consumer soci-
eties had reached a level of boredom and passiveness that prevents 
the occurrence of any dynamic historic event, as if history had come 
to a halt and nothing could jolt it back into motion.
But was Japan in the Tokugawa period indeed a ‘post-historical’ 
realm? Actually, I would argue that it depends on the perspective: 
1  Fukuyama theorizes the concept of ‘the end of history’ in his seminal book (1992) by picking 
up on Hegel and Kojève ― as a matter of fact, he cites Kojève’s remark about Tokugawa Japan 
as a posthistorical territory. Fukuyama makes several specific references to Japan, not only to 
the Tokugawa era, but also to the period after World War Two.
In 1999, Akira Asada publishes ‘Rekishi no owari’ wo koete (“Beyond the ‘end of history’”), a 
collection of dialogues with some of the most prominent intellectuals of the West ― he also 
talks to Fukuyama, precisely about the ‘hot’ issue of the end of history in Japan. Asada is, in 
fact, the one who identifies the third instance of ‘end of history’ in Japan ― the contemporary 
one.
Baudrillard, on the other hand, in his dialogues with Guillaume (2002), links the end of his-
tory with the so-called ‘archetypes’ that the West uses to interpret Japan. These archetypes in-
clude, for example, snobbery ― the ability of the Japanese to develop and promote totally con-
tentless art forms such as Nō theatre or tea ceremony, perpetual alterity, and the deletion of borders 
between man-made and natural.
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for one looking at the map of the world on a ship set out to travel 
the seas ― yes, Japan was outside the accessible realm; for one im-
mersed in the map of Edo ― no. Things were completely different, 
in the sense that many social, cultural and political developments 
were under way, that would prove to be crucial in the moderniza-
tion of the country, to such an extent that one might even claim 
that modernization had already begun in 17th century Tokugawa 
Japan.
2 .　The samurai reinvented
Reinhard Bendix (1999) claims that the ‘vocabulary of modern 
sociology’ may have originated in a few countries of North-West 
Europe, but it is utterly irrelevant outside the area in which mod-
ern technology and the modern processes of social and political 
change started. In that particular area of Europe, it was only natu-
ral that change should be seen as immanent and, at the same time, 
steady and permeating enough to influence all aspects of the social 
structure and of the cultural life. In Japan, however, when develop-
ment started after 1868, the theoretical and social premises were 
different (Bendix 1999: 471): “Every industrial country retains fea-
tures of its preindustrial society, and the forms of industrial societ-
ies are likely to differ widely depending on their earlier traditions.”
In other words, in Japan, the ‘symbiosis’ between tradition and 
modernity was destroyed, while political and social changes were 
brought about not by the gradual adaptation to the terre-à-terre 
frame of mind of technology, but by ‘conquest, military occupa-
tion, and partition’. In Japan, the move into modernity occurred 
through a sort of “aristocratic revolution” that went from top to 
bottom, which explains one of the main paradoxes of Japanese so-
cial life after the Meiji Restoration: the privileged position of the 
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aristocracy was in no way challenged by the shift in paradigm, and 
nor was the status of the samurai (officially, they did lose their 
privileges and were rather discontent with that, but in reality they 
had already become scholars and defenders of moral virtues rather 
than warriors). Again, the sakoku policy may have played a crucially 
important part in the absence of competing ideologies: since the 
country was secluded, there were almost no outside influences until 
1868 ― and if there were, their magnitude was completely negli-
gible. The lack of ideological polarization, in its turn, caused re-
sentment to never build up and become associated with any ideolo-
gy whatsoever, which prevented the emergence of any large-scale 
social upheaval that would attempt to change things from the bot-
tom up. Thus, the advent of modernity in Japan was not the result 
of a democratic movement that jolted the whole of society, but 
rather a smooth, downward, steady motion.
The samurai were unable (and, to certain extent, unwilling) to 
resist the mutation in their status and position within society for 
several reasons: first of all, they had all been removed from the 
land, which left them deprived of a feeling of belongingness which 
is essential in the crystallization of social unrest into a coherent 
project. Secondly, they had already gone through a process of rela-
tive demilitarization and increasing bureaucratization which had 
left them almost powerless and unable to organize in concerted re-
sistance against anything, be it the pervasive influence of the sho-
gunate and of the feudal lords during the Tokugawa period, or the 
swift industrialization and re-organization of society at the begin-
ning of the Meiji era. Moreover, the removal from the land and 
a certain anti-rural bias had transformed the samurai into 
‘urban(ized)’ individuals, more at home with the thrill of the city 
than with the rigours of war. As Bendix puts it (1999: 476):
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In terms of their education, bearing, and ideas, the samurai certainly remained attached 
to their tradition of physical prowess and chivalric honor […], but this was a militarism 
without war and above all it was an individualized military stance. […] Thus Japan en-
tered the modern world in 1868 under the leadership of a demilitarized aristocracy that 
was turning its attention to the promotion of education and economic enterprise as a 
necessary precondition of the country’s eventual political and military renaissance […].
In other words, in actuality, the ideal of the warrior (still associ-
ated with the samurai in some of the literature) had been gradually 
superseded by ideals of personal conduct more appropriate for a bu-
reaucrat. In Tokugawa Japan, an ‘ideology of merit’ ( = meritocra-
cy) had developed ― at least in principle ― which stated that 
merit should be the criterion to govern appointment for an office. 
This ideology was very satisfactory for the samurai as it appeased 
their pride and aspirations. However, at the same time, it increased 
the already existing tensions between the feudal lords with their 
respective domains, and the shogunate in Edo. This meritocracy is 
the very reason why the samurai were capable to accept the 
shock ― if there indeed was one ― of the Meiji Restoration: they 
were now able to gain access to the highest positions, and that is 
precisely what happened. This is yet another instance in the mod-
ernization of Japan where traditional features embedded within so-
ciety (i.e., the underscoring of status distinction and the preference 
given to merit) allow for modernity to move in very swiftly and 
thoroughly; in Japan, a ‘rupture’ view of modernity is almost im-
possible. There are, of course, other elements to support this propo-
sition, and I will discuss them briefly in the following sections.
Another factor that facilitated the re-invention of the samurai as 
supporters and leaders of the new paradigm was the acute discrep-
ancy between their high social rank (they occupied the first posi-
tion in the official hierarchy of shi-nō-kō-shō 士農工商 in Tokuga-
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wa Japan) and their lowly economic position. As a matter of fact, 
most of them could barely make ends meet and were highly depen-
dent upon the money they received as loans, stipends or bribes 
from the wealthy merchants. This, along with their extremely low 
resistance to change ― due mostly to the fact that they had been 
severed from the land ― allowed them to be versatile and mobile. 
Another factor was the reality that most of them were highly edu-
cated: not only were they versed in the art of war, but they were 
also knowledgeable in Confucianist writings. Their (almost) aristo-
cratic aversion to moneymaking, combined with the habits of fru-
gality, made them dynamic and eager to act without much hope for 
a material reward. Moreover, the cult of action they had been incul-
cated with through the principles of bushidō 武士道 and the new 
ideology of aspiration derived from meritocracy actually trans-
formed them in one of the most efficient vectors for the moderniza-
tion of Japan. Their privileged status was abolished by the Meiji 
government through a series of reforms which instituted a system 
of conscription for a regular army ― this move equalized society 
to a great extent and, at the same time, deprived the samurai of 
their exclusive right to bear a sword. However, far from being de-
terred by this, the samurai were very quick to adapt: they took the 
initiative and, during the first decade after the Meiji Restoration, 
they provided the majority of the key figures in the central govern-
ment and in the local administration.  
3 .　The merchants reinvented
According to Marion J. Levy (1999: 432-434), the initial stage 
of modernity in Japan basically refers to a society in which no ele-
ments of modern industrial production are present and which is in 
fact self-sufficient to a high degree mainly because it is predomi-
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nantly agrarian, with a clear-cut distinction between towns and 
villages. The vast majority of the people (including the samurai) 
were living close to the margin of subsistence, while the shogunate 
was constantly trying, by various means, to keep under control and 
minimize the possibilities for social change ― thus, the govern-
mental structure was a combination of highly centralized and high-
ly decentralized elements. The Tokugawa shogunate was indeed 
one of the most tightly and effectively controlled feudal systems, 
and it worked in no mysterious ways: by emphasizing Confucian 
values such as loyalty and filial piety, the shogunate imposed the 
family system as one of the main repositories and guarantors of loy-
alty and, therefore, stability 2 . This is precisely the reason why 
many of the administrative posts were determined hereditarily, and 
the same thing happened with samurai, merchants and artisans 
themselves. Merchants, for instance, would leave their business to 
their eldest son, and if they only had daughters, it was almost a 
sort of moral duty for them to find an heir through adoption 3 ―
in this fashion, family life was closely connected with one’s office or 
work, which made the idea of loyalty all the easier to enforce. Levy 
synthesizes the role of the family system as a vector of social control 
as follows (451):
[…] subjects of the Tokugawa both knew and, of their own will apparently, came to ac-
cept the tremendous emphasis placed on loyalty to the various positions in the feudal hi-
erarchy. Every man’s first duty was to his overlord. This obligation surpassed even the 
2  The emphasis placed by the Tokugawa shogunate on filial piety and on the family system 
eventually led to an emphasis on primogeniture as well, which, in time, led to the continued 
concentration of wealth in a single family line (as fortunes were usually not divided between 
several heirs), but also to the emergence of a whole new class of cadets, who ― at least in theo-
ry ― had a relatively higher degree of social mobility.  
3  The commercial and financial conglomerates (zaibatsu 財閥 ) that appeared in Japan after the 
Meiji Restoration were actually based and functioned upon the same system of family values. 
Most of the first  and biggest zaibatsu monopolies ― Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, or Yasu-
da ― in 19
th century Japan actually developed directly out of Tokugawa merchant families.
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family obligation […]
In a class system that was theoretically completely closed, there 
was almost no mobility: no matter how rich and influential, a mer-
chant could never become a member of the nobility. “He might be-
come the power behind the throne of a daimyo, but he could not 
become one.” (Levy 455) Moreover, since merchants were not al-
lowed to own land, their only hope for security remained their ef-
forts to become more and more economically efficient and success-
ful ― in time, they became more and more cohesive and coherent 
as a group and, eventually, due to their steady accumulation of for-
tune, they became the sole foci of power apart from the Tokugawa 
themselves.
In Levy’s view, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 marks the begin-
ning of a transitional period characterized by the intertwining of 
the old, traditional social order, with the introduction of new con-
cepts and forces. Levy speaks of a ‘disintegration of the old order’ 
when referring to the premodern paradigm of Tokugawa times: as 
an example of such disintegration, she cites the ‘rise in actual pow-
er and importance’ of the merchants who were, economically, 
stronger than any of the other classes. She then claims that the 
merchants had grown to be a sort of middle class in their economic 
roles, because they were entrepreneurs, they traded, they offered fi-
nancing for both production and consumption, they lent money 
and they finally created banks. Even though they were not very nu-
merous, they came to play a quintessential role in culture as well, 
as they developed a theatre and a literature largely their own ―
the precursors of many of the forms of popular culture in contem-
porary Japan are to be found in Tokugawa developments associated 
with the culture of the chōnin in general, and with the merchants in 
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particular. 
However, I propose that the rise in power of the merchants is not 
necessarily a sign of disintegration of the old order; many of the te-
nets of tradition were preserved and taken into modernity, but they 
became less conspicuous under the ceaseless avalanche of flashy new 
things imported from the West. The samurai, re-invented and dis-
guised as bureaucrats, were the brains in Japan’s entry into moder-
nity, but the merchants were the muscle, as they carried the whole 
financial burden of such an enterprise. Things changed in the sur-
face ― dusty roads were replaced by railways, wood was supplant-
ed by steel etc. ― but the inner workings of society remained (al-
most) unchanged. The hugely powerful monopolies that formed 
after 1868 were still organized and run like a family, and they still 
relied on loyalty and other Confucian virtues in order to func-
tion ― these values were simply pushed back on to a second, less 
visible plane. The ‘disruption’ is in fact nothing more than conti-
nuity.
Such gradual transformations in the very fabric of Tokugawa so-
ciety ― subtle yet thorough, slow yet pervasive transforma-
tions ― actually prepared the ground for Japan’s opening to the 
West. When Commodore Perry’s ships arrived in 1853 and forced 
Japan to end the sakoku period, the Japanese were not unprepared 
for what followed; on the contrary, they understood very quickly 
the enjeu and the significance of this new challenge. The country 
had not been a Sleeping Beauty waken form her slumber by a 
prince, it had not been dormant within its boundaries. Paradoxical-
ly, the sakoku policy had created an environment which was more 
than fertile and prepared for modernity. As Levy puts it (460-461):
The Japanese feat came as close to being one of lifting oneself by one’s bootstraps as the 
modern world has ever seen. They started close to bankruptcy, used almost no foreign 
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capital, established uneconomic heavy industries, organized and maintained a modern 
military and naval establishment, changed their governmental system radically, altered 
their system of production and consumption of goods and services to one in which mod-
ern industry was strategic, erected and conducted many highly profitable modern enter-
prises, made literacy of a sort virtually universal, and taught their people to operate ef-
fectively in terms of types of relationships that had been relatively unimportant and 
unknown in the Tokugawa period. They did it all with virtually no internal bloodshed 
or disintegration of major proportions, and they were very far along with the job in no 
more than five decades. 
During this amazing feat, the merchants, who were, in a sense, 
‘liberated’ by the new government, were allowed to do what they 
were already accustomed to do, but without restrictions, and this is 
where their power of influence eventually came from. They, along 
with the samurai, were among the ‘happy few’ whose traditional 
social roles and positions within society made adaptation to strate-
gic roles in the new paradigm relatively easy. Even though the 
structure of Japanese society was changed radically ― at least in 
the surface ― there were some things/phenomena/social categories 
that remained virtually unchanged in the new context. 
4 .　Modernity as a Japanese model
My conclusion would be that, in Japan, modernity should not be 
viewed or perceived as a threatening entity involved in a life-or-
death clash with tradition; on the contrary, the dynamic blending 
between the traditional and the modern is extremely telling with 
respect to the way in which modernity as a coherent project 
evolved within a different frame of mind. Japan had an (almost) 
unbroken tradition of the Emperor as the single source of legitima-
cy and figure of authority ― with the restoration, the Meiji em-
peror became at the same time the keeper of tradition and the to-
ken and promoter of modernity. The lack of religious conscious-
ness, or rather, the high degree of religious syncretism that 
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characterized (and still does) the Japanese way of thinking, ac-
counts for the lack of ideological exaggerations, doctrinal disputes 
and desperate confrontations. The oligarchic rule of the ex-samurai 
newly re-invented as bureaucrats was undisputed because it de-
rived its legitimacy and strength from the Confucian legacy of the 
Tokugawa system; loyalty was not dismissed, but redirected from 
the shogun to the emperor and, by extension, to everything that 
the emperor upheld, including abstract ideas such as modernity. As 
a consequence, the authority of the emperor was further strength-
ened, and the imperial government became the guarantor of order. 
Moreover, the advent of modernity was a rather smooth change be-
cause Japan had the opportunity of brûler les étapes, as it borrowed 
from the industrially more advanced countries a technology that 
was both ready-made and up-to-date for that time, thus skipping 
the whole process of trial and error that had led to the creation of 
those technologies. Last but not least, Japan also had the chance to 
witness ‘the importance of political initiative in attempts to pro-
mote economic change and to cope with the intensified divisions of 
the population’ (Bendix 1999).
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